# FLAW3D: A Trojan-based Cyber Attack on the Physical Outcomes of Additive Manufacturing

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2104.09562 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2104.09562/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 19 Apr 2021.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Needle in a Haystack: Detecting Subtle Malicious Edits to Additive Manufacturing G-code Files](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2111.12746/) (2021)
- [Side-Channel Attacks Survive Noise Cancellation in 3D Printers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.13952/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Additive Manufacturing (AM) systems such as 3D printers use inexpensive microcontrollers that rarely feature cybersecurity defenses. This is a risk, especially given the rising threat landscape within the larger digital manufacturing domain. In this work we demonstrate this risk by presenting the design and study of a malicious Trojan (the FLAW3D bootloader) for AVR-based Marlin-compatible 3D printers (>100 commercial models). We show that the Trojan can hide from programming tools, and even within tight design constraints (less than 1.7 kilobytes in size), it can compromise the quality of additively manufactured prints and reduce tensile strengths by up to 50%.