# N-player games and mean field games of moderate interactions

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2104.03944 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2104.03944/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 8 Apr 2021.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Finite-Sample Convergence Bounds for Trust Region Policy Optimization in Mean-Field Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.22781/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We study the asymptotic organization among many optimizing individuals interacting in a suitable "moderate" way. We justify this limiting game by proving that its solution provides approximate Nash equilibria for large but finite player games. This proof depends upon the derivation of a law of large numbers for the empirical processes in the limit as the number of players tends to infinity. Because it is of independent interest, we prove this result in full detail. We characterize the solutions of the limiting game via a verification argument.