# Prior-Independent Auctions for the Demand Side of Federated Learning

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.14375 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.14375/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 13 of its 23 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 26 Mar 2021.

## Builds on (most cited first, 13 of 13)

- [Communication-Efficient Learning of Deep Networks from Decentralized Data](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1602.05629/) (2016)
- [Fashion-MNIST: a Novel Image Dataset for Benchmarking Machine Learning Algorithms](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1708.07747/) (2017)
- [Deep Learning with Differential Privacy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1607.00133/) (2016)
- [Measuring the Effects of Non-Identical Data Distribution for Federated Visual Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1909.06335/) (2019)
- [Towards Federated Learning at Scale: System Design](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1902.01046/) (2019)
- [Inverting Gradients -- How easy is it to break privacy in federated learning?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.14053/) (2020)
- [Exploiting Unintended Feature Leakage in Collaborative Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1805.04049/) (2018)
- [Fair Resource Allocation in Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1905.10497/) (2019)
- [Subsampled R'enyi Differential Privacy and Analytical Moments Accountant](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1808.00087/) (2018)
- [Comprehensive Privacy Analysis of Deep Learning: Passive and Active White-box Inference Attacks against Centralized and Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1812.00910/) (2018)
- [Toward an Automated Auction Framework for Wireless Federated Learning Services Market](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1912.06370/) (2019)
- [BlockFLow: An Accountable and Privacy-Preserving Solution for Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2007.03856/) (2020)
- [Mechanism Design for Multi-Party Machine Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2001.08996/) (2020)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Federated learning (FL) is a paradigm that allows distributed clients to learn a shared machine learning model without sharing their sensitive training data. While largely decentralized, FL requires resources to fund a central orchestrator or to reimburse contributors of datasets to incentivize participation. Inspired by insights from prior-independent auction design, we propose a mechanism, FIPIA (Federated Incentive Payments via Prior-Independent Auctions), to collect monetary contributions from self-interested clients. The mechanism operates in the semi-honest trust model and works even if clients have a heterogeneous interest in receiving high-quality models, and the server does not know the clients' level of interest. We run experiments on the MNIST, FashionMNIST, and CIFAR-10 datasets to test clients' model quality under FIPIA and FIPIA's incentive properties.