# Democratic Forking: Choosing Sides with Social Choice

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.03652 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.03652/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 5 Mar 2021.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Social Choice Around the Block: On the Computational Social Choice of Blockchain](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.07777/) (2022)
- [Foundations for Grassroots Democratic Metaverse](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.04090/) (2022)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Any community in which membership is optional may eventually break apart, or fork. For example, forks may occur in political parties, business partnerships, social groups, cryptocurrencies, and federated governing bodies. Forking is typically the product of informal social processes or the organized action of an aggrieved minority, and it is not always amicable. Forks usually come at a cost, and can be seen as consequences of collective decisions that destabilize the community. Here, we provide a social choice setting in which agents can report preferences not only over a set of alternatives, but also over the possible forks that may occur in the face of disagreement. We study this social choice setting, concentrating on stability issues and concerns of strategic agent behavior.