# Egalitarian Judgment Aggregation

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.02785 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2102.02785/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 6 of its 69 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 4 Feb 2021.

## Builds on (most cited first, 6 of 6)

- [A Voting-Based System for Ethical Decision Making](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1709.06692/) (2017)
- [Justified Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1407.8269/) (2014)
- [Properties of Multiwinner Voting Rules](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1506.02891/) (2015)
- [On Truthful Mechanisms for Maximin Share Allocations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1605.04026/) (2016)
- [Complexity of Judgment Aggregation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1401.5863/) (2014)
- [Hunting for Tractable Languages for Judgment Aggregation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1808.03043/) (2018)

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Collective discrete optimisation as judgment aggregation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.00574/) (2021)
- [Finding Common Ground for Incoherent Horn Expressions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2209.06455/) (2022)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Egalitarian considerations play a central role in many areas of social choice theory. Applications of egalitarian principles range from ensuring everyone gets an equal share of a cake when deciding how to divide it, to guaranteeing balance with respect to gender or ethnicity in committee elections. Yet, the egalitarian approach has received little attention in judgment aggregation -- a powerful framework for aggregating logically interconnected issues. We make the first steps towards filling that gap. We introduce axioms capturing two classical interpretations of egalitarianism in judgment aggregation and situate these within the context of existing axioms in the pertinent framework of belief merging. We then explore the relationship between these axioms and several notions of strategyproofness from social choice theory at large. Finally, a novel egalitarian judgment aggregation rule stems from our analysis; we present complexity results concerning both outcome determination and strategic manipulation for that rule.