# Participatory Funding Coordination: Model, Axioms and Rules

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.11722 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2101.11722/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 27 Jan 2021.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Combinatorial Civic Crowdfunding with Budgeted Agents: Welfare Optimality at Equilibrium and Optimal Deviation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.13941/) (2022)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We present a new model of collective decision making that captures important crowd-funding and donor coordination scenarios. In the setting, there is a set of projects (each with its own cost) and a set of agents (that have their budgets as well as preferences over the projects). An outcome is a set of projects that are funded along with the specific contributions made by the agents. For the model, we identify meaningful axioms that capture concerns including fairness, efficiency, and participation incentives. We then propose desirable rules for the model and study, which sets of axioms can be satisfied simultaneously. An experimental study indicates the relative performance of different rules as well as the price of enforcing fairness axioms.