# Incentive Mechanism Design for Federated Learning: Hedonic Game Approach

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.09673 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2101.09673/

## Key facts

- Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 24 Jan 2021.

## Built on by (most cited first, 8 of 8)

- [Incentive Mechanisms for Federated Learning: From Economic and Game Theoretic Perspective](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2111.11850/) (2021)
- [Optimality and Stability in Federated Learning: A Game-theoretic Approach](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.09580/) (2021)
- [Models of fairness in federated learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.00818/) (2021)
- [How to Collaborate: Towards Maximizing the Generalization Performance in Cross-Silo Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.13236/) (2024)
- [Acoustic Model Optimization over Multiple Data Sources: Merging and Valuation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.15620/) (2024)
- [Incentivizing High-quality Participation From Federated Learning Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.16731/) (2025)
- [Gaming and Cooperation in Federated Learning: What Can Happen and How to Monitor It](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.02391/) (2025)
- [Stable and Budget-Feasible Coalition Formation for Clustered Federated Learning: A Hedonic Potential-Game Approach](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.26788/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Incentive mechanism design is crucial for enabling federated learning. We deal with clustering problem of agents contributing to federated learning setting. Assuming agents behave selfishly, we model their interaction as a stable coalition partition problem using hedonic games where agents and clusters are the players and coalitions, respectively. We address the following question: is there a family of hedonic games ensuring a Nash-stable coalition partition? We propose the Nash-stable set which determines the family of hedonic games possessing at least one Nash-stable partition, and analyze the conditions of non-emptiness of the Nash-stable set. Besides, we deal with the decentralized clustering. We formulate the problem as a non-cooperative game and prove the existence of a potential game.