# Communication complexity of Nash equilibrium in potential games

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.06660 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2011.06660/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 12 Nov 2020.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Secret Collusion among AI Agents: Multi-Agent Deception via Steganography](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.07510/) (2024)
- [Fast swap regret minimization and applications to approximate correlated equilibria](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.19647/) (2023)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We prove communication complexity lower bounds for (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium in potential games. In particular, we show that finding a Nash equilibrium requires poly(N) communication in two-player N × N potential games, and 2poly(n) communication in n-player two-action games. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first results to demonstrate hardness in any model of (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium in potential games.