# Hedonic Expertise Games

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.01778 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2011.01778/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 3 Nov 2020.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Strategic Resource Selection with Homophilic Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.00843/) (2023)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We consider a team formation setting where agents have varying levels of expertise in a global set of required skills, and teams are ranked with respect to how well the expertise of teammates complement each other. We model this setting as a hedonic game, and we show that this class of games possesses many desirable properties, some of which are as follows: A partition that is Nash stable, core stable and Pareto optimal is always guaranteed to exist. A contractually individually stable partition (and a Nash stable partition in a restricted setting) can be found in polynomial-time. A core stable partition can be approximated within a factor of 1 - frac1e, and this bound is tight unless sf P = NP. We also introduce a larger and relatively general class of games, which we refer to as monotone submodular hedonic games with common ranking property. We show that the above multi-concept existence guarantee also holds for this larger class of games.