# Power in Liquid Democracy

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2010.07070 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2010.07070/

## Key facts

- Cited by 7 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 14 Oct 2020.

## Built on by (most cited first, 7 of 7)

- [Unravelling multi-agent ranked delegations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2111.13145/) (2021)
- [When Can Liquid Democracy Unveil the Truth?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2104.01828/) (2021)
- [Measuring a Priori Voting Power -- Taking Delegations Seriously](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2301.02462/) (2023)
- [The Cost Perspective of Liquid Democracy: Feasibility and Control](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.02380/) (2025)
- [Computation and Bribery of Voting Power in Delegative Simple Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2104.03692/) (2021)
- [Pandering in a Flexible Representative Democracy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.09986/) (2022)
- [Swimming with Whales: Analysis of Power Imbalances in Stake-Weighted Governance](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.19264/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The paper develops a theory of power for delegable proxy voting systems. We define a power index able to measure the influence of both voters and delegators. Using this index, which we characterize axiomatically, we extend an earlier game-theoretic model by incorporating power-seeking behavior by agents. We analytically study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in such a model. Finally, by means of simulations, we study the effect of relevant parameters on the emergence of power inequalities in the model.