# Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions: Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2010.01420 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2010.01420/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 3 Oct 2020.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Online Combinatorial Allocations and Auctions with Few Samples](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.11091/) (2024)
- [Single-Sample and Robust Online Resource Allocation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.02963/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We present a computationally-efficient truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders that achieves an O((log!logm)3)-approximation to the maximum welfare in expectation using O(n) demand queries; here m and n are the number of items and bidders, respectively. This breaks the longstanding logarithmic barrier for the problem dating back to the O(logm·log!logm)-approximation mechanism of Dobzinski from 2007. Along the way, we also improve and considerably simplify the state-of-the-art mechanisms for submodular bidders.