# Strategy Proof Mechanisms for Facility Location with Capacity Limits

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.07986 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2009.07986/

## Key facts

- Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 17 Sep 2020.

## Built on by (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [Equilibria in Two-Stage Facility Location with Atomic Clients](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.03114/) (2024)
- [Facility Location Games Beyond Single-Peakedness: the Entrance Fee Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.11282/) (2022)
- [Equitable Mechanism Design for Facility Location](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.10460/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

An important feature of many real world facility location problems are capacity limits on the facilities. We show here how capacity constraints make it harder to design strategy proof mechanisms for facility location, but counter-intuitively can improve the guarantees on how well we can approximate the optimal solution.