# Participatory Budgeting with Cumulative Votes

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.02690 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2009.02690/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 6 Sep 2020.

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [Generative AI voting: fair collective choice is resilient to LLM biases and inconsistencies](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.11871/) (2024)
- [Learning Aggregation Rules in Participatory Budgeting: A Data-Driven Approach](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.01864/) (2024)
- [Upgrading Democracies with Fairer Voting Methods](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.14349/) (2025)
- [Fair Voting Methods as a Catalyst for Democratic Resilience: A Trilogy on Legitimacy, Impact and AI Safeguarding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.17461/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

In participatory budgeting we are given a set of projects---each with a cost, an available budget, and a set of voters who in some form express their preferences over the projects. The goal is to select---based on voter preferences---a subset of projects whose total cost does not exceed the budget. We propose several aggregation methods based on the idea of cumulative votes, e.g., for the setting when each voter is given one coin and she specifies how this coin should be split among the projects. We compare our aggregation methods based on (1) axiomatic properties, and (2) computer simulations. We identify one method, Minimal Transfers over Costs, that demonstrates particularly desirable behavior. In particular, it significantly improves on existing methods, satisfies a strong notion of proportionality, and, thus, is promising to be used in practice.