# Failures of Contingent Thinking

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.07703 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2007.07703/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 15 Jul 2020.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Hypothetical Expected Utility](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.15979/) (2021)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We present a behavioral definition of an agent's perceived implication that uniquely identifies a subjective state-space representing her view of a decision problem, and which may differ from the modeler's. By examining belief updating within this model, we formalize the recent empirical consensus that reducing uncertainty improves contingent thinking, and propose a novel form of updating corresponding to the agent 'realizing' a flaw in her own thinking. Finally, we clarify the sense in which contingent thinking makes state-bystate dominance more cognitively demanding than obvious dominance.