# A Survey of Published Attacks on Intel SGX

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.13598 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.13598/

## Key facts

- Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 24 Jun 2020.

## Built on by (most cited first, 10 of 10)

- [No Privacy Left Outside: On the (In-)Security of TEE-Shielded DNN Partition for On-Device ML](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.07152/) (2023)
- [Optimistic Verifiable Training by Controlling Hardware Nondeterminism](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.09603/) (2024)
- [Network Shuffling: Privacy Amplification via Random Walks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.03919/) (2022)
- [OLIVE: Oblivious Federated Learning on Trusted Execution Environment against the risk of sparsification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.07165/) (2022)
- [TEESlice: Protecting Sensitive Neural Network Models in Trusted Execution Environments When Attackers have Pre-Trained Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2411.09945/) (2024)
- [Activation Functions Considered Harmful: Recovering Neural Network Weights through Controlled Channels](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.19142/) (2025)
- [On Model Protection in Federated Learning against Eavesdropping Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.02114/) (2025)
- [Scalable and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation on Decentralised Web](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.20062/) (2023)
- [Provably Secure Retrieval-Augmented Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.01084/) (2025)
- [Privacy-Preserving Iris Recognition: Performance Challenges and Outlook](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.26890/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) provides a trusted execution environment (TEE) to run code and operate sensitive data. SGX provides runtime hardware protection where both code and data are protected even if other code components are malicious. However, recently many attacks targeting SGX have been identified and introduced that can thwart the hardware defence provided by SGX. In this paper we present a survey of all attacks specifically targeting Intel SGX that are known to the authors, to date. We categorized the attacks based on their implementation details into 7 different categories. We also look into the available defence mechanisms against identified attacks and categorize the available types of mitigations for each presented attack.