# Representing Pure Nash Equilibria in Argumentation

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.11020 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.11020/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 19 Jun 2020.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [AMELIA: A Family of Multi-task End-to-end Language Models for Argumentation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.17926/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil's Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, prove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.
