# Towards the Role of Theory of Mind in Explanation

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.02963 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.02963/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 6 May 2020.

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [Unpacking Large Language Models with Conceptual Consistency](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2209.15093/) (2022)
- [Deception Analysis with Artificial Intelligence: An Interdisciplinary Perspective](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.05724/) (2024)
- [Be Considerate: Objectives, Side Effects, and Deciding How to Act](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.02617/) (2021)
- [Adaptation and Communication in Human-Robot Teaming to Handle Discrepancies in Agents' Beliefs about Plans](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.03362/) (2023)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Theory of Mind is commonly defined as the ability to attribute mental states (e.g., beliefs, goals) to oneself, and to others. A large body of previous work - from the social sciences to artificial intelligence - has observed that Theory of Mind capabilities are central to providing an explanation to another agent or when explaining that agent's behaviour. In this paper, we build and expand upon previous work by providing an account of explanation in terms of the beliefs of agents and the mechanism by which agents revise their beliefs given possible explanations. We further identify a set of desiderata for explanations that utilize Theory of Mind. These desiderata inform our belief-based account of explanation.