# Security Assurance Cases -- State of the Art of an Emerging Approach

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.14151 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.14151/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 31 Mar 2020.

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [Evaluating Assurance Cases as Text-Attributed Graphs for Structure and Provenance Analysis](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.20577/) (2026)
- [E-LENS: User Requirements-Oriented AI Ethics Assurance](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.04747/) (2025)
- [OntoGSN: An Ontology-Based Framework for Semantic Management and Extension of Assurance Cases](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.11023/) (2025)
- [Safety Case Patterns for VLA-based driving systems: Insights from SimLingo](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.16013/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Security Assurance Cases (SAC) are a form of structured argumentation used to reason about the security properties of a system. After the successful adoption of assurance cases for safety, SACs are getting significant traction in recent years, especially in safety-critical industries (e.g., automotive), where there is an increasing pressure to be compliant with several security standards and regulations. Accordingly, research in the field of SAC has flourished in the past decade, with different approaches being investigated. In an effort to systematize this active field of research, we conducted a systematic literature review (SLR) of the existing academic studies on SAC. Our review resulted in an in-depth analysis and comparison of 51 papers. Our results indicate that, while there are numerous papers discussing the importance of security assurance cases and their usage scenarios, the literature is still immature with respect to concrete support for practitioners on how to build and maintain a SAC. More importantly, even though some methodologies are available, their validation and tool support is still lacking.