# Timing uncertainty in collective risk dilemmas encourages group reciprocation and polarization

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.07317 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.07317/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 16 Mar 2020.

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [Voluntary safety commitments provide an escape from over-regulation in AI development](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2104.03741/) (2021)
- [Social physics in the age of artificial intelligence](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.16900/) (2026)
- [Modeling the effects of environmental and perceptual uncertainty using deterministic reinforcement learning dynamics with partial observability](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2109.07259/) (2021)
- [Learning Collective Action under Risk Diversity](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2201.12891/) (2022)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Human social dilemmas are often shaped by actions involving uncertain goals and returns that may only be achieved in the future. Climate action, voluntary vaccination and other prospective choices stand as paramount examples of this setting. In this context, as well as in many other social dilemmas, uncertainty may produce non-trivial effects. Whereas uncertainty about collective targets and their impact were shown to negatively affect group coordination and success, no information is available about timing uncertainty, i.e. how uncertainty about when the target needs to be reached affects the outcome as well as the decision-making. Here we show experimentally, through a collective dilemma wherein groups of participants need to avoid a tipping point under the risk of collective loss, that timing uncertainty prompts not only early generosity but also polarized contributions, in which participants' total contributions are distributed more unfairly than when there is no uncertainty. Analyzing participant behavior reveals, under uncertainty, an increase in reciprocal strategies wherein contributions are conditional on the previous donations of the other participants, a group analogue of the well-known Tit-for-Tat strategy. Although large timing uncertainty appears to reduce collective success, groups that successfully collect the required amount show strong reciprocal coordination. This conclusion is supported by a game theoretic model examining the dominance of behaviors in case of timing uncertainty. In general, timing uncertainty casts a shadow on the future that leads participants to respond early, encouraging reciprocal behaviors, and unequal contributions.