# Secure Traffic Lights: Replay Attack Detection for Model-based Smart Traffic Controllers

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.04244 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.04244/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 9 Mar 2020.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Fool the Stoplight: Realistic Adversarial Patch Attacks on Traffic Light Detectors](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.04823/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Rapid urbanization calls for smart traffic management solutions that incorporate sensors, distributed traffic controllers and V2X communication technologies to provide fine-grained traffic control to mitigate congestion. As in many other cyber-physical systems, smart traffic management systems typically lack security measures. This allows numerous opportunities for adversarial entities to craft attacks on the sensor networks, wireless data sharing and/or the distributed traffic controllers. We show that such vulnerabilities can be exploited to disrupt mobility in a large urban area and cause unsafe conditions for drivers and the pedestrians on the roads. Specifically, in this paper, we look into vulnerabilities in model-based traffic controllers and show that, even with state-of-the-art attack detectors in place, false-data injection can be used to hamper mobility. We demonstrate a replay attack by modeling an isolated intersection in VISSIM, a popular traffic simulator and also discuss countermeasures to thwart such attacks.