# Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.11362 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.11362/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 26 Feb 2020.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Calibration without Ground Truth](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.19862/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state, and who observe some information structure. For two agents we introduce a quantitative version of Aumann's Agreement Theorem, and show that it is equivalent to a characterization of feasible distributions due to Dawid et al. (1995). For any number of agents, we characterize feasible distributions in terms of a "no-trade" condition. We use these characterizations to study information structures with independent posteriors. We also study persuasion problems with multiple receivers, exploring the extreme feasible distributions.