# A Matching Mechanism with Anticipatory Tolls for Congestion Pricing

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.05269 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.05269/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 12 Feb 2020.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Dynamic Toll Prediction Using Historical Data on Toll Roads: Case Study of the I-66 Inner Beltway](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2104.10684/) (2021)

## Abstract (arXiv)

This paper presents a matching mechanism for assigning drivers to routes where the drivers pay a toll for the marginal delay they impose on other drivers. The simple matching mechanism is derived from the RANKING algorithm for online bipartite matching proposed by Karp et al. [8]. The toll, which is anticipatory in design, is an adaption of one proposed by Dong et al. [5]. Our research proves that the matching mechanism proposed here is pareto user-optimal and can be adapted to give network optimal results for the minimizing total social cost of travel.