# Fairness and Efficiency in Cake-Cutting with Single-Peaked Preferences

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.03174 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.03174/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 8 Feb 2020.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Items](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.14593/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We study the cake-cutting problem when agents have single-peaked preferences over the cake. We show that a recently proposed mechanism by Wang-Wu (2019) to obtain envy-free allocations can yield large welfare losses. Using a simplifying assumption, we characterize all Pareto optimal allocations, which have a simple structure: are peak-preserving and non-wasteful. Finally, we provide simple alternative mechanisms that Pareto dominate that of Wang-Wu, and which achieve envy-freeness or Pareto optimality.