# Incentive-Compatible Diffusion Auctions

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.06975 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2001.06975/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 20 Jan 2020.

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [Diffusion Models for Future Networks and Communications: A Comprehensive Survey](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.01586/) (2025)
- [Emerging Methods of Auction Design in Social Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.00381/) (2021)
- [Identifying Influential Users in Unknown Social Networks for Adaptive Incentive Allocation Under Budget Restriction](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2107.05992/) (2021)
- [Strategyproofness and Monotone Allocation of Auction in Social Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.14472/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Diffusion auction is a new model in auction design. It can incentivize the buyers who have already joined in the auction to further diffuse the sale information to others via social relations, whereby both the seller's revenue and the social welfare can be improved. Diffusion auctions are essentially non-typical multidimensional mechanism design problems and agents' social relations are complicatedly involved with their bids. In such auctions, incentive-compatibility (IC) means it is best for every agent to honestly report her valuation and fully diffuse the sale information to all her neighbors. Existing work identified some specific mechanisms for diffusion auctions, while a general theory characterizing all incentive-compatible diffusion auctions is still missing. In this work, we identify a sufficient and necessary condition for all dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) diffusion auctions. We formulate the monotonic allocation policies in such multidimensional problems and show that any monotonic allocation policy can be implemented in a DSIC diffusion auction mechanism. Moreover, given any monotonic allocation policy, we obtain the optimal payment policy to maximize the seller's revenue.