# Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting with Ordinal Preferences

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.00864 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1911.00864/

## Key facts

- Cited by 9 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 3 Nov 2019.

## Built on by (most cited first, 9 of 9)

- [Proportional Fairness in Clustering: A Social Choice Perspective](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.18162/) (2023)
- [Proportionally Representative Clustering](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.13917/) (2023)
- [Beyond RLHF and NLHF: Population-Proportional Alignment under an Axiomatic Framework](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.05619/) (2025)
- [Full Proportional Justified Representation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.12015/) (2025)
- [Maxmin Participatory Budgeting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.13923/) (2022)
- [What Should We Optimize in Participatory Budgeting? An Experimental Study](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2111.07308/) (2021)
- [Indivisible Participatory Budgeting under Weak Rankings](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2207.07981/) (2022)
- [Participatory Budgeting With Multiple Degrees of Projects And Ranged Approval Votes](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.10972/) (2023)
- [Algorithmic Shortlisting in Participatory Budgeting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.06577/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic paradigm whereby voters decide on a set of projects to fund with a limited budget. We consider PB in a setting where voters report ordinal preferences over projects and have (possibly) asymmetric weights. We propose proportional representation axioms and clarify how they fit into other preference aggregation settings, such as multi-winner voting and approval-based multi-winner voting. As a result of our study, we also discover a new solution concept for approval-based multi-winner voting, which we call Inclusion PSC (IPSC). IPSC is stronger than proportional justified representation (PJR), incomparable to extended justified representation (EJR), and yet compatible with EJR. The well-studied Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) rule produces a committee that satisfies both EJR and IPSC; however, both these axioms can also be satisfied by an algorithm that runs in polynomial-time.