# Blameworthiness in Security Games

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1910.08647 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1910.08647/

## Key facts

- Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 18 Oct 2019.

## Built on by (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [Responsibility Gap in Collective Decision Making](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.06312/) (2025)
- [Responsibility Gap and Diffusion in Sequential Decision-Making Mechanisms](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.02582/) (2025)
- [Peer Oversight in Collective Decision Making](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.28754/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Security games are an example of a successful real-world application of game theory. The paper defines blameworthiness of the defender and the attacker in security games using the principle of alternative possibilities and provides a sound and complete logical system for reasoning about blameworthiness in such games. Two of the axioms of this system capture the asymmetry of information in security games.