# A Geometric Model of Opinion Polarization

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1910.05274 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1910.05274/

## Key facts

- Cited by 7 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 11 Oct 2019.

## Built on by (most cited first, 7 of 7)

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- [Leveraging Large Language Models for Collective Decision-Making](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.04928/) (2023)
- [Decision-Dependent Stochastic Optimization: The Role of Distribution Dynamics](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.07324/) (2025)
- [Online Recommendations for Agents with Discounted Adaptive Preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.06014/) (2023)
- [Online Stackelberg Optimization via Nonlinear Control](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.18805/) (2024)
- [Optimally Improving Cooperative Learning in a Social Setting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.20808/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We introduce a simple, geometric model of opinion polarization. It is a model of political persuasion, as well as marketing and advertising, utilizing social values. It focuses on the interplay between different topics and persuasion efforts. We demonstrate that societal opinion polarization often arises as an unintended byproduct of influencers attempting to promote a product or idea. We discuss a number of mechanisms for the emergence of polarization involving one or more influencers, sending messages strategically, heuristically, or randomly. We also examine some computational aspects of choosing the most effective means of influencing agents, and the effects of those strategic considerations on polarization.