# LEAP: A Lightweight Encryption and Authentication Protocol for In-Vehicle Communications

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.10380 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1909.10380/

## Key facts

- Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 23 Sep 2019.

## Built on by (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [A Reinforcement Learning Approach for GNSS Spoofing Attack Detection of Autonomous Vehicles](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.08628/) (2021)
- [Graph-Powered Defense: Controller Area Network Intrusion Detection for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.02539/) (2024)
- [STATGRAPH: Effective In-vehicle Intrusion Detection via Multi-view Statistical Graph Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.07056/) (2023)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The Controller Area Network (CAN) is considered as the de-facto standard for the in-vehicle communications due to its real-time performance and high reliability. Unfortunately, the lack of security protection on the CAN bus gives attackers the opportunity to remotely compromise a vehicle. In this paper, we propose a Lightweight Encryption and Authentication Protocol (LEAP) with low cost and high efficiency to address the security issue of the CAN bus. LEAP exploits the security-enhanced stream cipher primitive to provide encryption and authentication for the CAN messages. Compared with the state-of-the-art Message Authentication Code (MAC) based approaches, LEAP requires less memory, is 8X faster, and thwarts the most recently proposed attacks.