# Strategic Voting Under Uncertainty About the Voting Method

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.09110 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1907.09110/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 22 Jul 2019.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Social Choice Should Guide AI Alignment in Dealing with Diverse Human Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.10271/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Much of the theoretical work on strategic voting makes strong assumptions about what voters know about the voting situation. A strategizing voter is typically assumed to know how other voters will vote and to know the rules of the voting method. A growing body of literature explores strategic voting when there is uncertainty about how others will vote. In this paper, we study strategic voting when there is uncertainty about the voting method. We introduce three notions of manipulability for a set of voting methods: sure, safe, and expected manipulability. With the help of a computer program, we identify voting scenarios in which uncertainty about the voting method may reduce or even eliminate a voter's incentive to misrepresent her preferences. Thus, it may be in the interest of an election designer who wishes to reduce strategic voting to leave voters uncertain about which of several reasonable voting methods will be used to determine the winners of an election.