# The Role of Cooperation in Responsible AI Development

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.04534 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1907.04534/

## Key facts

- Cited by 21 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 10 Jul 2019.

## Built on by (most cited first, 21 of 21)

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- [Quantifying detection rates for dangerous capabilities: a theoretical model of dangerous capability evaluations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.15433/) (2024)
- [Solipsistic Superintelligence is Unlikely to be Cooperative](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.03237/) (2026)
- [Falling Behind Drives Unsafe Development in an Idealised AI Race Experiment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.26034/) (2026)
- [Safe Transformative AI via a Windfall Clause](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.09404/) (2021)
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- [Humans Are More Diverse: Frontier LLMs Show Extreme Policies in Idealised AI Development Races](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.01193/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

In this paper, we argue that competitive pressures could incentivize AI companies to underinvest in ensuring their systems are safe, secure, and have a positive social impact. Ensuring that AI systems are developed responsibly may therefore require preventing and solving collective action problems between companies. We note that there are several key factors that improve the prospects for cooperation in collective action problems. We use this to identify strategies to improve the prospects for industry cooperation on the responsible development of AI.
