# Terminal Ranking Games

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.09628 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1906.09628/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 23 Jun 2019.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [MESOB: Balancing Equilibria & Social Optimality](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.07911/) (2023)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We analyze a mean field tournament: a mean field game in which the agents receive rewards according to the ranking of the terminal value of their projects and are subject to cost of effort. Using Schr"odinger bridges we are able to explicitly calculate the equilibrium. This allows us to identify the reward functions which would yield a desired equilibrium and solve several related mechanism design problems. We are also able to identify the effect of reward inequality on the players' welfare as well as calculate the price of anarchy.