# The Android Platform Security Model (2023)

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.05572 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1904.05572/

## Key facts

- Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 11 Apr 2019.

## Built on by (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [ceLLMate: Sandboxing Browser AI Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.12594/) (2025)
- [A Comprehensive Analysis of Evolving Permission Usage in Android Apps: Trends, Threats, and Ecosystem Insights](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.02008/) (2025)
- [Documentation-Guided Agentic Codebase Migration from C to Rust](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.14634/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Android is the most widely deployed end-user focused operating system. With its growing set of use cases encompassing communication, navigation, media consumption, entertainment, finance, health, and access to sensors, actuators, cameras, or microphones, its underlying security model needs to address a host of practical threats in a wide variety of scenarios while being useful to non-security experts. To support this flexibility, Android's security model must strike a difficult balance between security, privacy, and usability for end users; provide assurances for app developers; and maintain system performance under tight hardware constraints. This paper aims to both document the assumed threat model and discuss its implications, with a focus on the ecosystem context in which Android exists. We analyze how different security measures in past and current Android implementations work together to mitigate these threats, and, where there are special cases in applying the security model in practice; we discuss these deliberate deviations and examine their impact.