# The Role of Strategic Load Participants in Two-Stage Settlement Electricity Markets

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.08341 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1903.08341/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 20 Mar 2019.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [A Data-Driven Convergence Bidding Strategy Based on Reverse Engineering of Market Participants' Performance: A Case of California ISO](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2109.09238/) (2021)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Two-stage electricity market clearing is designed to maintain market efficiency under ideal conditions, e.g., perfect forecast and nonstrategic generation. This work demonstrates that the individual strategic behavior of inelastic load participants in a two-stage settlement electricity market can deteriorate efficiency. Our analysis further implies that virtual bidding can play a role in alleviating this loss of efficiency by mitigating the market power of strategic load participants. We use real-world market data from New York ISO to validate our theory.