# Selling Multiple Items via Social Networks

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.02703 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1903.02703/

## Key facts

- Cited by 6 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 7 Mar 2019.

## Built on by (most cited first, 6 of 6)

- [Emerging Methods of Auction Design in Social Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.00381/) (2021)
- [GAC: A Deep Reinforcement Learning Model Toward User Incentivization in Unknown Social Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.09578/) (2022)
- [Social Sourcing: Incorporating Social Networks Into Crowdsourcing Contest Design](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.02884/) (2021)
- [Sybil-Proof Diffusion Auction in Social Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.01984/) (2022)
- [Multi-Unit Diffusion Auctions with Intermediaries](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.07796/) (2022)
- [Strategyproofness and Monotone Allocation of Auction in Social Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.14472/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We consider a market where a seller sells multiple units of a commodity in a social network. Each node/buyer in the social network can only directly communicate with her neighbours, i.e. the seller can only sell the commodity to her neighbours if she could not find a way to inform other buyers. In this paper, we design a novel promotion mechanism that incentivizes all buyers, who are aware of the sale, to invite all their neighbours to join the sale, even though there is no guarantee that their efforts will be paid. While traditional sale promotions such as sponsored search auctions cannot guarantee a positive return for the advertiser (the seller), our mechanism guarantees that the seller's revenue is better than not using the advertising. More importantly, the seller does not need to pay if the advertising is not beneficial to her.