# Taxonomy and Challenges of Out-of-Band Signal Injection Attacks and Defenses

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1901.06935 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1901.06935/

## Key facts

- Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 21 Jan 2019.

## Built on by (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [They See Me Rollin': Inherent Vulnerability of the Rolling Shutter in CMOS Image Sensors](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2101.10011/) (2021)
- [Signal Injection Attacks against CCD Image Sensors](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.08881/) (2021)
- [Side Auth: Synthesizing Virtual Sensors for Authentication](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2301.11745/) (2023)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Recent research has shown that the integrity of sensor measurements can be violated through out-of-band signal injection attacks. These attacks target the conversion process from a physical quantity to an analog property---a process that fundamentally cannot be authenticated. Out-of-band signal injection attacks thus pose previously-unexplored security risks by exploiting hardware imperfections in the sensors themselves, or in their interfaces to microcontrollers. In response to the growing-yet-disjointed literature in the subject, this article presents the first survey of out-of-band signal injection attacks. It focuses on unifying their terminology and identifying commonalities in their causes and effects through a chronological, evolutionary, and thematic taxonomy of attacks. By highlighting cross-influences between different types of out-of-band signal injections, this paper underscores the need for a common language irrespective of the attack method. By placing attack and defense mechanisms in the wider context of their dual counterparts of side-channel leakage and electromagnetic interference, this study identifies common threads and gaps that can help guide and inform future research. Overall, the ever-increasing reliance on sensors embedded in everyday commodity devices necessitates that a stronger focus be placed on improving the security of such systems against out-of-band signal injection attacks.