# An Efficient and Truthful Pricing Mechanism for Team Formation in Crowdsourcing Markets

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.04865 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1812.04865/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 12 Dec 2018.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [A Comprehensive Survey of Artificial Intelligence Techniques for Talent Analytics](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.03195/) (2023)
- [Low Complexity Recruitment for Collaborative Mobile Crowdsourcing Using Graph Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.00717/) (2021)

## Abstract (arXiv)

In a crowdsourcing market, a requester is looking to form a team of workers to perform a complex task that requires a variety of skills. Candidate workers advertise their certified skills and bid prices for their participation. We design four incentive mechanisms for selecting workers to form a valid team (that can complete the task) and determining each individual worker's payment. We examine profitability, individual rationality, computational efficiency, and truthfulness for each of the four mechanisms. Our analysis shows that TruTeam, one of the four mechanisms, is superior to the others, particularly due to its computational efficiency and truthfulness. Our extensive simulations confirm the analysis and demonstrate that TruTeam is an efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets.
