# The 5G-AKA Authentication Protocol Privacy

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.06922 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1811.06922/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 16 Nov 2018.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Machine Learning Assisted Security Analysis of 5G-Network-Connected Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.03514/) (2021)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We study the 5G-AKA authentication protocol described in the 5G mobile communication standards. This version of AKA tries to achieve a better privacy than the 3G and 4G versions through the use of asymmetric randomized encryption. Nonetheless, we show that except for the IMSI-catcher attack, all known attacks against 5G-AKA privacy still apply. Next, we modify the 5G-AKA protocol to prevent these attacks, while satisfying the cost and efficiency constraints of the 5G-AKA protocol. We then formally prove that our protocol is sigma-unlinkable. This is a new security notion, which allows for a fine-grained quantification of a protocol privacy. Our security proof is carried out in the Bana-Comon indistinguishability logic. We also prove mutual authentication as a secondary result.