# Cyber Insurance

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.00290 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1810.00290/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 30 Sep 2018.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [NLP-Powered Repository and Search Engine for Academic Papers: A Case Study on Cyber Risk Literature with CyLit](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.06226/) (2024)
- [Entity-Specific Cyber Risk Assessment using InsurTech Empowered Risk Factors](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.08193/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

This chapter will first present a principal-agent game-theoretic model to capture the interactions between one insurer and one user. The insurer is deemed as the principal who does not have incomplete information about user's security policies. The user, which refers to the infrastructure operator or the customer, implements his local protection and pays a premium to the insurer. The insurer designs an incentive compatible insurance mechanism that includes the premium and the coverage policy, while the user determines whether to participate in the insurance and his effort to defend against attacks. The chapter will also focus on an attack-aware cyber insurance model by introducing the adversarial behaviors into the framework. The behavior of an attacker determines the type of cyber threats, e.g. denial of service (DoS) attacks, data breaches, phishing and spoofing. The distinction of threat types plays a role in determining the type of losses and the coverage policies. The data breaches can lead to not only financial losses but also damage of the reputations. The coverage may only cover certain agreed percentage of the financial losses.