# Blameworthiness in Strategic Games

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.05485 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1809.05485/

## Key facts

- Cited by 9 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 14 Sep 2018.

## Built on by (most cited first, 9 of 9)

- [From Intelligent Agents to Trustworthy Human-Centred Multiagent Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.02260/) (2022)
- [Anticipating Responsibility in Multiagent Planning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.16685/) (2023)
- [Responsibility in Extensive Form Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.07637/) (2023)
- [Higher-Order Responsibility](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.01003/) (2025)
- [Responsibility Gap and Diffusion in Sequential Decision-Making Mechanisms](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.02582/) (2025)
- [Counterfactual Reasoning for Causal Responsibility Attribution in Probabilistic Multi-Agent Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.13077/) (2026)
- [Responsibility-aware Strategic Reasoning in Probabilistic Multi-Agent Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2411.00146/) (2024)
- [A Graph-Theoretical Perspective on Law Design for Multiagent Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.06361/) (2025)
- [Diffusion of Responsibility in Collective Decision Making](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.07935/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games.