# A Framework for Approval-based Budgeting Methods

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.04382 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1809.04382/

## Key facts

- Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 12 Sep 2018.

## Built on by (most cited first, 8 of 8)

- [Maxmin Participatory Budgeting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.13923/) (2022)
- [What Should We Optimize in Participatory Budgeting? An Experimental Study](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2111.07308/) (2021)
- [Indivisible Participatory Budgeting under Weak Rankings](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2207.07981/) (2022)
- [Large Language Models for Designing Participatory Budgeting Rules](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.09349/) (2026)
- [Collective discrete optimisation as judgment aggregation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.00574/) (2021)
- [Participatory Budgeting With Multiple Degrees of Projects And Ranged Approval Votes](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.10972/) (2023)
- [Submodular Participatory Budgeting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.13586/) (2024)
- [Algorithmic Shortlisting in Participatory Budgeting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.06577/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We define and study a general framework for approval-based budgeting methods and compare certain methods within this framework by their axiomatic and computational properties. Furthermore, we visualize their behavior on certain Euclidean distributions and analyze them experimentally.