# Evolutionary, Mean-Field and Pressure-Resistance Game Modelling of Networks Security

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.06409 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1808.06409/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 20 Aug 2018.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Mean field games as a tool for AI safety: a worked example from the July 2026 Hugging Face incident](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.00902/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The recently developed mean-field game models of corruption and bot-net defence in cyber-security, the evolutionary game approach to inspection and corruption, and the pressure-resistance game element, can be combined under an extended model of interaction of large number of indistinguishable small players against a major player, with focus on the study of security and crime prevention. In this paper we introduce such a general framework for complex interaction in network structures of many players, that incorporates individual decision making inside the environment (the mean-field game component), binary interaction (the evolutionary game component), and the interference of a principal player (the pressure-resistance game component). To perform concrete calculations with this overall complicated model we work in three basic asymptotic regimes; fast execution of personal decisions, small rates of binary interactions, and small payoff discounting in time. By this approach we construct a class of solutions having the so-called turnpike property.