# Injected and Delivered: Fabricating Implicit Control over Actuation Systems by Spoofing Inertial Sensors

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.07558 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1806.07558/

## Key facts

- Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 20 Jun 2018.

## Built on by (most cited first, 10 of 10)

- [Invisible for both Camera and LiDAR: Security of Multi-Sensor Fusion based Perception in Autonomous Driving Under Physical-World Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.09249/) (2021)
- [Physical Attack on Monocular Depth Estimation with Optimal Adversarial Patches](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2207.04718/) (2022)
- [Towards Robust and Secure Embodied AI: A Survey on Vulnerabilities and Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.13175/) (2025)
- [APARATE: Adaptive Adversarial Patch for CNN-based Monocular Depth Estimation for Autonomous Navigation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.01351/) (2023)
- [Security Considerations in AI-Robotics: A Survey of Current Methods, Challenges, and Opportunities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.08565/) (2023)
- [Signal Injection Attacks against CCD Image Sensors](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.08881/) (2021)
- [SoK: A Modularized Approach to Study the Security of Automatic Speech Recognition Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.10651/) (2021)
- [SpecGuard: Specification Aware Recovery for Robotic Autonomous Vehicles from Physical Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.15200/) (2024)
- [ARMOR: Robust Reinforcement Learning-based Control for UAVs under Physical Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.22423/) (2025)
- [Banshee: Target Switch Attacks on Gimbal-Stabilized Visual Tracking Systems via Acoustic Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.09930/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Inertial sensors provide crucial feedback for control systems to determine motional status and make timely, automated decisions. Prior efforts tried to control the output of inertial sensors with acoustic signals. However, their approaches did not consider sample rate drifts in analog-to-digital converters as well as many other realistic factors. As a result, few attacks demonstrated effective control over inertial sensors embedded in real systems. This work studies the out-of-band signal injection methods to deliver adversarial control to embedded MEMS inertial sensors and evaluates consequent vulnerabilities exposed in control systems relying on them. Acoustic signals injected into inertial sensors are out-of-band analog signals. Consequently, slight sample rate drifts could be amplified and cause deviations in the frequency of digital signals. Such deviations result in fluctuating sensor output; nevertheless, we characterize two methods to control the output: digital amplitude adjusting and phase pacing. Based on our analysis, we devise non-invasive attacks to manipulate the sensor output as well as the derived inertial information to deceive control systems. We test 25 devices equipped with MEMS inertial sensors and find that 17 of them could be implicitly controlled by our attacks. Furthermore, we investigate the generalizability of our methods and show the possibility to manipulate the digital output through signals with relatively low frequencies in the sensing channel.