# Near-Optimal Communication Lower Bounds for Approximate Nash Equilibria

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.06387 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1805.06387/

## Key facts

- Cited by 6 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 16 May 2018.

## Built on by (most cited first, 6 of 6)

- [Fast swap regret minimization and applications to approximate correlated equilibria](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.19647/) (2023)
- [Provably Efficient Policy Optimization for Two-Player Zero-Sum Markov Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2102.08903/) (2021)
- [Smooth Nash Equilibria: Algorithms and Complexity](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.12226/) (2023)
- [Algorithmic Collusion and the Complexity of Information-Value-Free Equilibria](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.22757/) (2026)
- [Computational Lower Bounds for Regret Minimization in Normal-Form Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2411.01721/) (2024)
- [Protocols for Verifying Smooth Strategies in Bandits and Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.10567/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We prove an N2-o(1) lower bound on the randomized communication complexity of finding an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium (for constant ε>0) in a two-player N× N game.