# Environmental feedback drives cooperation in spatial social dilemmas

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.06745 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1802.06745/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 19 Feb 2018.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Modeling the effects of environmental and perceptual uncertainty using deterministic reinforcement learning dynamics with partial observability](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2109.07259/) (2021)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Exploiting others is beneficial individually but it could also be detrimental globally. The reverse is also true: a higher cooperation level may change the environment in a way that is beneficial for all competitors. To explore the possible consequence of this feedback we consider a coevolutionary model where the local cooperation level determines the payoff values of the applied prisoner's dilemma game. We observe that the coevolutionary rule provides a significantly higher cooperation level comparing to the traditional setup independently of the topology of the applied interaction graph. Interestingly, this cooperation supporting mechanism offers lonely defectors a high surviving chance for a long period hence the relaxation to the final cooperating state happens logarithmically slow. As a consequence, the extension of the traditional evolutionary game by considering interactions with the environment provides a good opportunity for cooperators, but their reward may arrive with some delay.