# Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting: Axioms and Algorithms

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.08226 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1711.08226/

## Key facts

- Cited by 9 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 22 Nov 2017.

## Built on by (most cited first, 9 of 9)

- [Beyond RLHF and NLHF: Population-Proportional Alignment under an Axiomatic Framework](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.05619/) (2025)
- [Full Proportional Justified Representation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.12015/) (2025)
- [Maxmin Participatory Budgeting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.13923/) (2022)
- [What Should We Optimize in Participatory Budgeting? An Experimental Study](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2111.07308/) (2021)
- [Indivisible Participatory Budgeting under Weak Rankings](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2207.07981/) (2022)
- [Large Language Models for Designing Participatory Budgeting Rules](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.09349/) (2026)
- [Participatory Budgeting with Donations and Diversity Constraints](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2104.15075/) (2021)
- [Participatory Budgeting With Multiple Degrees of Projects And Ranged Approval Votes](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.10972/) (2023)
- [Submodular Participatory Budgeting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.13586/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Participatory budgeting is one of the exciting developments in deliberative grassroots democracy. We concentrate on approval elections and propose proportional representation axioms in participatory budgeting, by generalizing relevant axioms for approval-based multi-winner elections. We observe a rich landscape with respect to the computational complexity of identifying proportional budgets and computing such, and present budgeting methods that satisfy these axioms by identifying budgets that are representative to the demands of vast segments of the voters.