# Social Integration in Two-Sided Matching Markets

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.08033 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.08033/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 22 May 2017.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Guaranteeing Maximin Shares: Some Agents Left Behind](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2105.09383/) (2021)

## Abstract (arXiv)

When several two-sided matching markets merge into one, it is inevitable that some agents will become worse off if the matching mechanism used is stable. I formalize this observation by defining the property of integration monotonicity, which requires that every agent becomes better off after any number of matching markets merge. Integration monotonicity is also incompatible with the weaker efficiency property of Pareto optimality. Nevertheless, I obtain two possibility results. First, stable matching mechanisms never hurt more than one-half of the society after the integration of several matching markets occurs. Second, in random matching markets there are positive expected gains from integration for both sides of the market, which I quantify.