# On Stackelberg Mixed Strategies

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.07476 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.07476/

## Key facts

- Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 21 May 2017.

## Built on by (most cited first, 10 of 10)

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- [Learning to Incentivize Information Acquisition: Proper Scoring Rules Meet Principal-Agent Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.08613/) (2023)
- [Commitment with Signaling under Double-sided Information Asymmetry](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.11446/) (2022)
- [2 × 2 Zero-Sum Games with Commitments and Noisy Observations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.01703/) (2022)
- [VISER: A Tractable Solution Concept for Games with Information Asymmetry](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.09652/) (2023)
- [When Should a Leader Act Suboptimally? The Role of Inferability in Repeated Stackelberg Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.00468/) (2023)
- [Leveraging Noisy Observations in Zero-Sum Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.02861/) (2024)
- [Solving a Stackelberg Game on Transportation Networks in a Dynamic Crime Scenario: A Mixed Approach on Multi-Layer Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.14514/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

It is sometimes the case that one solution concept in game theory is equivalent to applying another solution concept to a modified version of the game. In such cases, does it make sense to study the former separately (as it applies to the original representation of the game), or should we entirely subordinate it to the latter? The answer probably depends on the particular circumstances, and indeed the literature takes different approaches in different cases. In this article, I consider the specific example of Stackelberg mixed strategies. I argue that, even though a Stackelberg mixed strategy can also be seen as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a corresponding extensive-form game, there remains significant value in studying it separately. The analysis of this special case may have implications for other solution concepts.