# Leaky Cauldron on the Dark Land: Understanding Memory Side-Channel Hazards in SGX

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.07289 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.07289/

## Key facts

- Cited by 15 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 20 May 2017.

## Built on by (most cited first, 15 of 15)

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- [Approximating ReLU on a Reduced Ring for Efficient MPC-based Private Inference](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.04875/) (2023)
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- [Data Leakage via Access Patterns of Sparse Features in Deep Learning-based Recommendation Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.06264/) (2022)
- [Dynamic Frequency-Based Fingerprinting Attacks against Modern Sandbox Environments](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.10715/) (2024)
- [How to Securely Shuffle? A survey about Secure Shufflers for privacy-preserving computations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.01487/) (2025)
- [CrypTorch: PyTorch-based Auto-tuning Compiler for Machine Learning with Multi-party Computation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.19711/) (2025)
- [Integrating Homomorphic Encryption and Trusted Execution Technology for Autonomous and Confidential Model Refining in Cloud](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.00963/) (2023)
- [Reliable and Private Utility Signaling for Data Markets](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.07975/) (2025)
- [Privacy-Preserving Iris Recognition: Performance Challenges and Outlook](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.26890/) (2026)
- [TrEEStealer: Stealing Decision Trees via Enclave Side Channels](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.18716/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Side-channel risks of Intel's SGX have recently attracted great attention. Under the spotlight is the newly discovered page-fault attack, in which an OS-level adversary induces page faults to observe the page-level access patterns of a protected process running in an SGX enclave. With almost all proposed defense focusing on this attack, little is known about whether such efforts indeed raise the bar for the adversary, whether a simple variation of the attack renders all protection ineffective, not to mention an in-depth understanding of other attack surfaces in the SGX system. In the paper, we report the first step toward systematic analyses of side-channel threats that SGX faces, focusing on the risks associated with its memory management. Our research identifies 8 potential attack vectors, ranging from TLB to DRAM modules. More importantly, we highlight the common misunderstandings about SGX memory side channels, demonstrating that high frequent AEXs can be avoided when recovering EdDSA secret key through a new page channel and fine-grained monitoring of enclave programs (at the level of 64B) can be done through combining both cache and cross-enclave DRAM channels. Our findings reveal the gap between the ongoing security research on SGX and its side-channel weaknesses, redefine the side-channel threat model for secure enclaves, and can provoke a discussion on when to use such a system and how to use it securely.