# The Conference Paper Assignment Problem: Using Order Weighted Averages to Assign Indivisible Goods

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.06840 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.06840/

## Key facts

- Cited by 6 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 19 May 2017.

## Built on by (most cited first, 6 of 6)

- [Matching Papers and Reviewers at Large Conferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.12273/) (2022)
- [Combating Collusion Rings is Hard but Possible](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.08444/) (2021)
- [Group Fairness in Peer Review](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.03474/) (2024)
- [EFX Allocations Exist for Binary Valuations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.05503/) (2023)
- [Peer Selection with Noisy Assessments](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2107.10121/) (2021)
- [Exploring Social Choice Mechanisms for Recommendation Fairness in SCRUF](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.08621/) (2023)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Motivated by the common academic problem of allocating papers to referees for conference reviewing we propose a novel mechanism for solving the assignment problem when we have a two sided matching problem with preferences from one side (the agents/reviewers) over the other side (the objects/papers) and both sides have capacity constraints. The assignment problem is a fundamental problem in both computer science and economics with application in many areas including task and resource allocation. We draw inspiration from multi-criteria decision making and voting and use order weighted averages (OWAs) to propose a novel and flexible class of algorithms for the assignment problem. We show an algorithm for finding a Sigma-OWA assignment in polynomial time, in contrast to the NP-hardness of finding an egalitarian assignment. Inspired by this setting we observe an interesting connection between our model and the classic proportional multi-winner election problem in social choice.