# Rank Maximal Equal Contribution: a Probabilistic Social Choice Function

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.00544 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.00544/

## Key facts

- Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 1 May 2017.

## Built on by (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [Proportionally Representative Clustering](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.13917/) (2023)
- [Indivisible Participatory Budgeting under Weak Rankings](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2207.07981/) (2022)
- [Characterization of Group-Fair Social Choice Rules under Single-Peaked Preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2207.07984/) (2022)

## Abstract (arXiv)

When aggregating preferences of agents via voting, two desirable goals are to incentivize agents to participate in the voting process and then identify outcomes that are Pareto efficient. We consider participation as formalized by Brandl, Brandt, and Hofbauer (2015) based on the stochastic dominance (SD) relation. We formulate a new rule called RMEC (Rank Maximal Equal Contribution) that satisfies the strongest notion of participation and is also ex post efficient. The rule is polynomial-time computable and also satisfies many other desirable fairness properties. The rule suggests a general approach to achieving ex post efficiency and very strong participation.